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E-mail address: ulku@bilkent.edu.tr (Ü. Gürler).This study considers a two level supply chain in a newsboy setting with two substitutable
products. Demands for the two products are assumed independent as long as both are
available. If, however, a product stocks out, some of its demand is transferred to the avail-
able one with a known probability which ultimately creates a dependence on the amount
of purchased items. The retailer is allowed to return some or all of the unsold products to
the manufacturer with some credit. The expected chain proﬁt, the retailer’s and the man-
ufacturer’s proﬁt expressions are derived under general conditions. Special cases are
inspected to investigate the conditions under which channel coordination is achieved. It
is demonstrated that channel coordination can not be achieved if unlimited returns are
allowed with full credit, a result that agrees with the ﬁndings of Pasternak [B.A. Pasternack,
Optimal pricing and return policies for perishable commodities, Market. Sci. 4 (1985) 166–
176] for the single item case. For the cases of unlimited returns with partial credit, the con-
ditions for coordination are derived for one way full substitutions. For exponential demand
explicit expressions for the channel and retailer’s expected proﬁt functions are provided.
 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Supply chain management and contracts between levels of a supply chain have gained considerable attention in the last
decade.
In supply chains, uncertainties arising from factors such as market demand, process yield, product quality, competition
and promotions introduce risks to both the manufacturers and the retailers. In order to increase the performance of the sys-
tem by sharing the risks involved, contracts that include speciﬁcations regarding the quality, quantity, return rates and
wholesale prices are undertaken between the manufacturer and the retailer with the purpose that such agreements would
be beneﬁcial to both parties. Most commonly studied examples of contracts are sales rebate, quantity ﬂexibility, wholesale
price, buyback and revenue sharing contracts, each of which provides the retailer with different incentives to make them
order more than they would with only a wholesale price scheme. Quantity ﬂexibility contracts provide some refund to
the retailer when demand is lower than the order quantity, whereas the sales rebate contracts offer the retailer some incen-
tive when demand is greater than a threshold, so that the retailer pays less for the units sold beyond this threshold. In rev-
enue-sharing contracts, the manufacturer gets some credit per unit sold to the retailer in addition to a percentage of the
retailers revenue. In buyback contracts, all or some of the unsold products are returned to the manufacturer for some credit.
Coordination among the retailer and the manufacturer is an important issue in designing contracts. In channel coordina-
tion, the objective is to bring the decentralized expected proﬁt closer to the centralized expected proﬁt and if they are equal,
channel coordination is achieved.. All rights reserved.
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where the retailer is allowed to return some unsold products to the manufacturer. It is assumed that substitution takes place
only at stockout situations. General expressions are derived for the expected total proﬁt of the supply chain, the expected
proﬁt of the retailer and the expected proﬁt of the manufacturer. Some special cases, regarding the substitution probabilities
and return proportions are considered to obtain the necessary conditions for channel coordination. It is found that contracts
that allow for unlimited returns with full credit can not coordinate the system, whereas unlimited returns with partial cred-
its allow for coordination under one way or two way full substitution. These ﬁndings agree with the early work of [1] with
single product, in that unlimited returns with full credit does not coordinate the system. Furthermore if one way substitution
is in effect, the demand distribution for the stock-out product has an impact on the coordinating parameters. It is also ob-
served that substitution dynamics have signiﬁcant effect on the conditions under which coordination is achieved. The main
contribution of this study is twofold: derivation of the expected proﬁt functions of both parties in a two level chain with two
substitutable products under a buyback contract; and the identiﬁcation of the cases where the coordination is achieved.
A vast literature has accumulated about contracts and coordination in the last years, where an excellent review can be
found in [2]. We brieﬂy review below some work related to our study.
One of the earliest studies about channel coordination and buyback contracts is provided by Pasternack [1] for a newsboy
setting where the retailer is allowed to return some or all of the unsold items to the manufacturer with some credit. Paster-
nack [1] found that neither a policy that allows for unlimited returns at full credit, nor the one that allows for no returns can
achieve channel coordination, whereas coordination is achieved by a buyback contract with full returns at partial credit. An
important ﬁnding was that the channel coordinating parameters were independent of the demand distribution, which facil-
itates the task of the manufacturer to design a contract. In another study, [3] consider a manufacturer that uses a buyback
contract to manipulate the competition between the retailers. Buyback contracts intensify the degree of competition be-
tween the retailers. More intense retail competition means lower retailer prices and greater sales which results in larger
proﬁts for the manufacturer. Emmons and Gilbert [4] study buyback contracts where the retailer commits to both a stocking
quantity and a selling price and Donohue [5] studies buyback contracts in a model with multiple production modes that al-
lows for forecast updating. In another related work, manufacturer’s pricing and return policies are studied by Lau and Lau [6].
In traditional studies, the retailer can order any quantity from the manufacturer at any time. However, this is undesirable
from the manufacturer‘s point of view mostly due to the bullwhip effect which increases demand variance. To avoid the in-
creases in demand variability, minimum purchase agreements are suggested as studied by Anupindi and Akella [7]. The
advantages and limitations of revenue sharing contracts, where the retailer pays the manufacturer a percentage of the rev-
enue he generates in addition to the wholesale price, is studied by Cachon and Lariviere [8].
Although contracts and coordination issues for supply chains have been investigated extensively as briefed above, there
has been very limited work considering contracts with multiple products. To the best of our knowledge the only work with
multiple products (no substitution) is by Anupindi and Bassok [9], who consider contracts for multiple products when the
supplier offers business volume discounts. They argue that the optimal policy structure is complex and provide approxima-
tions based on the optimal policy of a similar contract with a single product.
Regarding the inventory control of multiple products with substitution, one of the early works is by Ignall and Veinott
[10] who studied the conditions under which myopic solution is optimal in the long run. McGillivray and Silver [11] inves-
tigated the effects of the substitutability on stock control rules and inventory costs. Their model assumed that if an item is
out of stock there is a ﬁxed probability of the customer to substitute another available item. They considered the case of total
substitutability (probability of substitution equaling one) and compared this with the case of no substitutability to obtain
limits on the potential beneﬁts achievable from substitution. Their results indicate that full substitution results in a decrease
in the total optimal order quantity and substitution is less effective if the stock levels and substitution probabilities are low.
Parlar and Goyal [12] studied a two product single period inventory model in which substitution occurs with a known prob-
ability. They showed that the total proﬁt function is concave for a wide variety of problem parameters and developed nec-
essary conditions for an optimal solution. In another study, Parlar [13] used a game theoretic approach to model two
independent decision makers whose products can be substituted if one becomes out of stock. He showed that there exist
a Nash equilibrium solution. See also Pasternack and Drezner [14] and Drezner et al. [15] for models with two substitutable
products and Gurnani and Drezner [16] for a deterministic nested substitution problem with multiple substitutable prod-
ucts, and Ernst and Kouvelis [17] for a problem with three substitutable products where the objective function is shown
to be jointly convex. Bassok et al. [18] consider a multiproduct single period inventory problem with downward substitution
and show that the beneﬁts of considering substitution in ordering decisions are higher with high demand variability, low
substitution costs and low price to cost ratios. Smith and Agrawal [19] developed a probabilistic demand model capturing
the effects of substitution, where inventory optimization includes both the selection of the set of items to stock and their
stock levels under resource constraints. See also Rajaram and Tang [20] who studied the impact of product substitution
on order quantities and proﬁts. Using a consumer choice model based on utility maximization, Mahajan and van Ryzin
[21] analyze a single period model with dynamic partial substitution. They show that the expected proﬁt is in general
not even quasi concave. Netessine and Rudi [22] consider both centralized and competitive inventory models under substi-
tution with deterministic proportions and Netessine et al. [23] consider a multi-product environment with multivariate de-
mand, allowing one level substitution and elaborate on the impact of correlation. Kraiselburd et al. [24] compare the vendor
managed and retailer managed inventory systems in the substitutable products setting with stochastic demand. Yadavalli
et al. [25] consider a model with two substitutable products, Poisson demands and joint ordering and study the stationary
Ü. Gürler, A. Yılmaz / Applied Mathematical Modelling 34 (2010) 539–551 541behavior of the inventory system. In a recent work, Karakul and Chan [26] consider the joint optimization of the pricing and
procurement decisions for two products when one of the products can be substituted by the other product. Due to the com-
plexity of the objective function, they provide sufﬁcient conditions under which the objective function is unimodal.
Organization of the paper is as follows: In Section 2, the general model is introduced and the expected proﬁt expressions
are provided. In Section 3, special cases are considered and necessary conditions to achieve channel coordination are ob-
tained. Finally, in Section 4 concluding remarks are made and future research directions are stated.
2. Model and analysis
We consider a single period newsboy type inventory problem with two substitutable perishable products in a two level
supply chain, consisting of a retailer and a manufacturer. Among the several contract types that are introduced in the pre-
vious section, we focus on the return contracts, where the retailer is allowed to return some or all of the unsold products to
the manufacturer with partial or full credit. Our set-up is similar to that of Pasternack [1], except that we generalize his study
for two substitutable products.
We ﬁrst derive the expressions for the total expected channel proﬁt, manufacturers and the retailer’s expected proﬁts
under general model parameters. We then investigate the special cases under which channel coordination is achieved.
For product i ði ¼ 1;2Þ, the following notation is used: the manufacturing cost per item is ci, the wholesale price paid by
the retailer to the manufacturer is di and pi is the selling price of the retailer. We denote the the order quantity of the retailer
and the production quantity of the manufacturer by Qi and the percentage of Qi that the retailer can return to the manufac-
turer is Ri. The credit paid by the manufacturer to the retailer for a returned item is denoted by si. The random demands for
products 1 and 2 are denoted by X and Y , respectively with density (or probability mass) functions f ðxÞ, gðyÞ and distribution
functions FðxÞ, GðyÞ, respectively. A customer will accept a unit of Product 2 when Product 1 is out of stock with probability a
and the probability of substituting Product 1 when Product 2 is out of stock is b. There is no cost for substitution and the
salvage value is zero. For consistency, we assume ci 6 di 6 pi. It is assumed that the demand for the two products are inde-
pendent in order to get more explicit structural results. Although the derivation of the objective function would be straight-
forward, the analysis would be highly complicated for correlated demand, as discussed by Netessine et al. [23]. On the other
hand, substitution dynamics eventually create a dependency between the effective demands of the two products. As to the
realization of demand and substitution, we assume that the demand for both products occur at the beginning of the period
and the original demand to each product is satisﬁed ﬁrst. If there is excess inventory from one product and there is excess
demand in the other, some or all of the excess demand is satisﬁed from the other product according to the probabilistic sub-
stitution behavior.
In the next section we derive the expressions for the expected total supply chain proﬁt, the retailer’s and the manufac-
turer’s expected proﬁts.
2.1. Total supply chain expected proﬁt
Using the notation and the assumptions discussed above, our aim is to derive the expression for the total expected proﬁt
of the supply chain, which will be denoted by EPTðQ1; Q2Þ, where Q1, Q2. Total expected proﬁt is obtained assuming that thea
b
c
de
f
Q1
aQ 1+Q 2=ax+y
Q1+bQ 2=x+by
Q2
Q1+Q 2
a
Q2+Q 1
b
O X
Y
Fig. 1. Six regions giving rise to the total expected proﬁt function.
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proﬁt over region i; i ¼ a; . . . ; f , and X ¼ x;Y ¼ y be the realized demands for products 1 and 2, respectively. Suppose the ini-
tial stocks for the products are Q1, Q2. In region a, demands for both of the products are less than their stock levels. In region
b, demand for product 1 exceeds its inventory level and the excess demand can be fully satisﬁed by product 2. In region c,
demand for product 1 exceeds its inventory level but the excess demand can only be partially satisﬁed by product 2. In re-
gion d, demands for both products are greater than their inventory levels. In region e, demand for product 2 exceeds its
inventory level and the excess demand can only be partially satisﬁed by product 1. In region f , demand for product 2 exceeds
its inventory level and can be fully satisﬁed by product 1. A simpliﬁed expression for the total supply chain expected proﬁt
expression is obtained by integrating the corresponding proﬁt expressions over their respective regions and adding the cost
of production c1Q1  c2Q2 (see also Parlar and Goyal, Eq. (11), p. 5). All the expressions in this section are given in terms of
integrals, which should be replaced by summations for discrete demands.
Proposition 2.1. Total expected proﬁt of the supply chain is given by:EPTðQ1;Q2Þ ¼ p1
Z Q1
0
FðxÞG Q2 þ
ðQ1  xÞ
b
 
dxþ p2  c2ð ÞQ2  p2
Z Q2
0
GðxÞF Q1 þ
ðQ2  xÞ
a
 
dxþ p1  c1ð ÞQ1: ð1ÞParlar and Goyal [12] shows that EPTðQ1;Q2Þ is jointly concave in ðQ1;Q2Þ provided that bp1 6 p2 6 p1=a.2.2. Retailer’s expected proﬁt
Next we consider the expected proﬁt of the retailer who orders from the manufacturer according to the buyback agree-
ment described above. The retailer orders Q1 and Q2 items from the two products at the beginning of the period at a cost of
d1Q1 þ d2Q2. Possible realizations of demand and substitutions together with returnable quantities are described in the ele-
ven regions a k as illustrated in Fig. 2. As before, let X ¼ x and Y ¼ y be the realized demands for the two products.
Let Ri ¼ 1 Ri be the proportion of the order quantity for which return is not allowed for product i. In region a, where
x 6 R1Q1 and y 6 R2Q2, RiQi of the unsold items are returned to the manufacturer according to the permitted return percent-
ages. In region b, where x 6 R1Q1 and R2Q2 6 y 6 Q2, only R1Q1 of the unsold items of product 1 is returned to the manu-
facturer but all the unsold ones from product 2 are returned since the leftovers are below the allowed return quantity. In
region c, where yP Q2;Q1  ðxþ bðy Q2ÞÞ > R1Q1, demand for product 2 exceeds the available inventory, the excess de-
mand is fully satisﬁed by product 1 and R1Q1 units of product 1 is returned to the manufacturer. Similarly, in region d,
yP Q2;Q1  ðxþ bðy Q2ÞÞ < R1Q1; xþ bðy Q2Þ < Q1, demand for product 2 exceeds its inventory level, the excess de-
mand is fully satisﬁed by product 1 and all unsold units of product 1 is returned to the manufacturer. In region f , where
R1Q1 6 x 6 Q1 and R2Q2 6 y 6 Q2, all the unsold items of product 1 and 2 are returned to the manufacturer. In region i, since
xP Q1 and yP Q2, demands for both products exceed their inventory levels therefore no substitution and returns take
place. Finally in region j, where yP Q2; xþ bðy Q2Þ < Q1 and x < Q1, demand for product 2 exceeds its inventory level,
the excess demand is only partially satisﬁed by product 1. Retailer’s expected proﬁt expression, EPRðQ1;Q2Þ, is obtained
by integrating the proﬁt expressions over their respective regions and adding the cost d1Q1  d2Q2. The result is given be-
low, the proof of which is given in Appendix.R2Q2
Q2
Q2+R 1Q1
b
Q2+ Q 1
b
R1Q1 Q1 Q1+R 2Q2
a
Q1+ Q 2
a
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Fig. 2. Eleven regions giving rise to the retailer‘s expected proﬁt function
Ü. Gürler, A. Yılmaz / Applied Mathematical Modelling 34 (2010) 539–551 543Proposition 2.2. Under the buyback contract, the retailer’s expected proﬁt is given by:EPRðQ1;Q2Þ ¼ p1
Z Q1
0
FðxÞG Q2 þ
ðQ1  xÞ
b
 
dxþ ðp2  d2ÞQ2 þ ðp1  d1ÞQ1  p2
Z Q2
0
GðxÞF Q1 þ
ðQ2  xÞ
a
 
dx
þ FðQ1Þs2
Z Q2
R2Q2
GðyÞdyþ GðQ2Þs1
Z Q1
R1Q1
FðxÞdxþ
Z 1
Q2
Z Q1bðyQ2Þ
R1Q1bðyQ2Þ
½Q1  x bðy Q2Þs1dFðxÞdGðyÞ
þ R1Q1s1
Z Q2þðR1Q1 Þb
Q2
FðR1:Q1  bðy Q2ÞÞdGðyÞ þ
Z 1
Q1
Z Q2aðxQ1Þ
R2Q2aðxQ1Þ
½Q2  y aðx Q1Þs2dGðyÞdFðxÞ
þ R2Q2s2
Z Q1þðR2Q2 Þa
Q1
GðR2Q2  aðx Q1ÞÞdFðxÞ: ð2ÞThe general expression above unfortunately does not allow to derive further insights due to its complexity. Hence we elab-
orate below some special cases.2.3. Special cases with one-way full substitution
Now we elaborate some special cases with full substitution and/or full return. Note ﬁrst that when two way full substi-
tution is allowed, the customers would buy the other product with certainty in stock-out cases, and no substitution cost is
incurred. Hence it would be optimal to carry inventory of only the product with higher proﬁt margin, which reduces the
problem to a single product case. Therefore, it is of interest to consider only the cases with one-way full substitution. Below
we introduce three cases with one-way full substitution accompanied with (a) no returns, (b) full returns and (c) full return
with one product and no return with the other.
Corollary 2.1
(a) No returns with one-way full substitution ða ¼ 1; b ¼ 0;R1 ¼ R2 ¼ 0ÞEPRðQ1;Q2Þ ¼ p1
Z Q1
0
FðxÞdxþ ðp1  d1ÞQ1  p2
Z Q2
0
FðQ1 þ Q2  yÞGðyÞdyþ ðp2  d2ÞQ2: ð3Þ(b) Full returns with one-way full substitution ða ¼ 1; b ¼ 0;R1 ¼ R2 ¼ 1ÞEPRðQ1;Q2Þ ¼ ðp1  s1Þ
Z Q1
0
FðxÞdxþ ðp1  d1ÞQ1  ðp2  s2Þ
Z Q2
0
FðQ1 þ Q2  yÞGðyÞdyþ ðp2  d2ÞQ2: ð4Þ(c) One-way full return with one-way full substitution ða ¼ 1; b ¼ 0;R1 ¼ 1;R2 ¼ 0ÞEPRðQ1;Q2Þ ¼ ðp1  s1Þ
Z Q1
0
FðxÞdxþ ðp1  d1ÞQ1  p2
Z Q2
0
FðQ1 þ Q2  yÞGðyÞdyþ ðp2  d2ÞQ2: ð5ÞProposition 2.3. For the special cases given in Corollary 2.1, EPRðQ1;Q2Þ is jointly concave in ðQ1;Q2Þ, provided that the following
conditions hold in each case:ðaÞ : p2 6 p1 ðbÞ : ðp2  s2Þ 6 ðp1  s1Þ ðcÞ : p2 6 ðp1  s1ÞProof. Directly follows from the concavity result of [12] after observing the similarity of the structures of the proﬁt functions
in (a)–(c) to that of (1) with modiﬁed parameters and rewriting the conditions for concavity accordingly with the modiﬁed
parameters.
Note that the conditions for the proposition above can be interpreted as the consistency conditions and in all cases
product 2 is substituted for product one. In part (a) returns are not allowed, hence p2, the price of the substituted product is
required to be less or equal p1, price of the ﬁrst choice product. In part (b) full returns are allowed and in this case it is
required that, the loss due to returns to manufacturer for the substituted product ðp2  s2Þ is less or equal the loss from the
return of the ﬁrst choice product, p1  s1. Finally in (c), the price of the product which is always purchased in place of the
other in case of stock-outs is needed to be less than the loss incurred when the ﬁrst product is returned to the manufacturer
instead of sold to a customer.
The case a ¼ 1; b ¼ 0;R1 ¼ 0;R2 ¼ 1, which implies that the second product is always substituted for the ﬁrst one and all
the left overs of the second product are allowed to be fully returned turns out to be more complicated. We ﬁrst present below
the resulting expression for the expected retailer proﬁt and then present some results to aid in the analysis of speciﬁc
cases. h
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case,EPRðQ1;Q2Þ ¼ p1
Z Q1
0
FðxÞdxþ ðp1  d1ÞQ1 þ ðp2  d2ÞQ2  ðp2  s2Þ
Z Q2
0
FðQ1 þ Q2  xÞGðxÞdx
 s2
Z Q2
0
½FðQ1 þ Q2Þ  FðQ1 þ Q2  xÞxdGðxÞ: ð6ÞProposition 2.4. For the special case of Corollary 2.2, letgðQ1;Q2Þ ¼ ðp2  s2Þ
Z Q2
0
f ðQ1 þ Q2  xÞGðxÞdx s2
Z Q2
0
½f ðQ1 þ Q2Þ  f ðQ1 þ Q2  xÞxdGðxÞ: ð7ÞAlso let g1ðQ1;Q2Þ  @g1ðQ1;Q2Þ=@Q1, g2Q1;Q2Þ  @g1Q1;Q2Þ=@Q2, g12Q1;Q2Þ  @2g1Q1;Q2Þ=@Q1@Q2 and
CðQ1;Q2Þ ¼ ðp2  s2ÞgðQ2ÞFðQ1Þ  s2 Q2f ðQ1ÞgðQ2Þ þ ½FðQ1 þ Q2Þ  FðQ1Þ Q2g0ðQ2Þ þ gðQ2Þ½ f gThen,
(a) the ﬁrst order conditions are given as0 ¼ ðp1  d1Þ  p1FðQ1Þ þ gðQ1;Q2Þ;
0 ¼ ðp2  d2Þ  ðp2  s2ÞGðQ2ÞFðQ1Þ  s2½FðQ1 þ Q2Þ  FðQ1ÞQ2gðQ2Þ þ gðQ1;Q2Þ:(b) Let HðQ1;Q2Þ  fhijg; i; j ¼ 1;2 be the Hessian matrix corresponding to EPRðQ1;Q2Þ. Then we have
h11 ¼ p1g1ðQ1;Q2Þ;
h12 ¼ g2ðQ1;Q2Þ;
h22 ¼ g2ðQ1;Q2Þ þ CðQ1;Q2Þ:Note that if h11 < 0, h22 < 0 and the determinant h11h22  h212 < 0, then EPRðQ1;Q2Þ is jointly concave. This must be
checked for any special application for the unique maximum to exist. The above analysis illustrate the difﬁculty of obtaining
general results even for some special cases. Nevertheless, to get some further insights, we consider another special case
regarding the demand distributions that allow for explicit expressions for the expected proﬁt functions.
2.3.1. Exponential demand
In this section, we elaborate the case where the demand for both products have exponential distribution with parameters
k and l for products 1 and 2, respectively, with FðxÞ ¼ 1 ekx and GðyÞ ¼ 1 ely. In order to evaluate the expressions for
the total expected proﬁt and the expected proﬁt of the retailer in special cases, deﬁne:Uða;b;Q ; sÞ ¼ ða bÞQ þ b
s
ð1 esQ Þ;
Wða;b;Q1;Q2; s1; s2Þ ¼ ða bÞQ1 þ b
1
s2
es2Q2 ð1 es2Q1 Þ þ 1
s1
1 es1Q1  es2Q2
s1  s2 e
s2Q1  es1Q1  :
Then, after some algebra, it can be shown that the total expected proﬁt reduces to the following for one way full substitution:EPTðQ1;Q2Þ ¼ Uðp1  c1; p1;Q1; kÞ þWðp2  c2;p2;Q2;Q1;l; kÞ:
Similarly, the retailer’s expected proﬁt is given as below for the special cases presented in Corollary 2.1:EPRðQ1;Q2Þ ¼
Uðp1  d1;p1;Q1; kÞ þWðp2  d2; p2;Q2;Q1;l; kÞ for ðaÞ
Uðp1  d1;p1  s1;Q1; kÞ þWðp2  d2; p2  s2;Q2;Q1;l; kÞ for ðbÞ
Uðp1  d1;p1  s1;Q1; kÞ þWðp2  d2; p2;Q2;Q1;l; kÞ for ðcÞ:
8><
>:Example 1. Suppose the demand for the products are independent exponential, with k ¼ 0:02 and l ¼ 0:05. As will become
clear in the next section, if the manufacturer allows no returns or allows full returns with full credit, the two parts of the
supply chain do not coordinate. Therefore in this example we consider one way full substitution ða ¼ 1; b ¼ 0Þ, full return
ðR1 ¼ R2 ¼ 1Þ case with partial credit. For Product 1, the system parameters are set to c1 ¼ 2:00, d1 ¼ 4:2, p1 ¼ 7:0 and
s1 ¼ 3:0; and for Product 2 c2 ¼ 3:00, d2 ¼ 5:2, p2 ¼ 7:0 and s2 ¼ 3:3.
Fig. 3a depicts the total channel proﬁt and b the expected proﬁt of the retailer when partial credit for the returned items
are offered as above. We ﬁnd that if substitution was not allowed, the news vendor values for Product 1 and 2 would be
Q1 ¼ 62 and Q2 ¼ 16. When coordination issues are not considered, if the manufacturer directly sells to the market, his
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Fig. 3. The expected total proﬁt and the expected proﬁt of the retailer. For Product 1, the parameters c1; d1; p1; s1 are respectively, 2.0, 4.20, 7.0 and 3.0. For
Product 2, c2;d2;p2; s2 are 3.0, 5.20, 7.0 and 3.30.
Ü. Gürler, A. Yılmaz / Applied Mathematical Modelling 34 (2010) 539–551 545optimal production quantities would be 49 and 30, respectively with an optimum proﬁt of 170.1. On the other hand with s1
and s2 as given above, the retailer’s optimum order quantities would be 53 and 22, respectively, resulting in an expected
proﬁt of 84.2. We observe that the manufacturer and retailer can not coordinate the channel with the above choices of di’s
and si’s. In the next section we will see how these parameters should be modiﬁed to achieve channel coordination.
Example 2. To illustrate how the expected proﬁt expressions react to the changes in system parameters, we consider
another example. Now set c1 ¼ 2:0, d1 ¼ 4:0, p1 ¼ 7:0 and s1 ¼ 3:0; and for Product 2 c1 ¼ 3:00, d1 ¼ 4:5, p1 ¼ 7:0 and
s1 ¼ 4. We again have the optimum channel quantities as 49 and 30 resulting in a proﬁt of 170.1 (since the proﬁt margin
has not changed). However the retailer’s optimal order quantities has changed to 32 and 84, respectively yielding a proﬁt
of 135. The general shape of the proﬁt functions are as given in the previous ﬁgure.2.4. Manufacturer’s expected proﬁt
We simply obtain the manufacturer’s expected proﬁt by noting that EPTðQ1;Q2Þ ¼ EPRðQ1;Q2Þ þ EPMðQ1;Q2Þ. However,
for the purpose of completeness, we provide below the resulting expression.
Proposition 2.4. The manufacturer’s expected proﬁt is given by:EPMðQ1;Q2Þ ¼ ðd1  c1ÞQ1 þ ðd2  c2ÞQ2  FðQ1Þs2
Z Q2
R2Q2
GðyÞdðyÞ  GðQ2Þs1
Z Q1
R1Q1
FðxÞdðxÞ

Z 1
Q2
Z Q1bðyQ2Þ
R1Q1bðyQ2Þ
½Q1  x bðy Q2Þs1dFðxÞdGðyÞ
 R1Q1s1
Z Q2þðR1Q1 Þb
Q2
FðR1Q1  bðy Q2ÞÞdGðyÞ

Z 1
Q1
Z Q2aðxQ1Þ
R2Q2aðxQ1Þ
½Q2  y aðx Q1Þs2dGðyÞdFðxÞ
 R2Q2s2
Z Q1þðR2Q2 Þa
Q1
GðR2Q2  aðx Q1ÞÞdFðxÞ: ð8Þ3. Channel coordination
We next consider several special cases regarding the substitution probabilities and return percentages, and investigate
the conditions under which channel coordination is achieved. Concavity of the total proﬁt function EPTðQ1;Q2Þ is proved
by Parlar and Goyal [12] under general conditions, from which the concavity of the EPRðQ1;Q2Þ follows as discussed in
the previous section. Hence, there exist unique inventory levels for both products that maximize the expected channel proﬁt
546 Ü. Gürler, A. Yılmaz / Applied Mathematical Modelling 34 (2010) 539–551as well as the expected proﬁt of the retailer. These quantities can be obtained from the ﬁrst order conditions. In some special
cases, these ﬁrst order conditions for the retailer are satisﬁed only when the order quantities are inﬁnite, in which case we
say that the system is sub-optimal. Similarly, when infeasible conditions are required for the channel coordination, such as
zero proﬁt of the manufacturer or the retailer, we refer to that as system sub-optimality. Below we provide the main results
concerning the channel coordinations, the proofs of which are given in the Appendix.
Case-1: Full returns with partial credit, no substitution
Suppose the retailer is allowed to return all unsold products to the manufacturer and there is no substitution between the
two products. This case is similar to two independent products and the results of [1] are valid for each one. Namely, a policy
that allows unlimited returns for full credit or that allows no returns is system suboptimal. However, a policy which allows
for unlimited returns at partial credit will be system optimal for appropriately chosen values of model parameters, as stated
below. Similarly, as discussed before the two way full substitution also reduces to a single product and the following result is
valid with the product that offers a higher proﬁt margin for the manufacturer.
Proposition 3.1. Let a ¼ 0; b ¼ 0;R1 ¼ R2 ¼ 1. Then channel coordination is achieved if the following conditions are satisﬁed:EP
T 
( Q
1,
Q
2 
)
Fig. 4.
Producp1  c1
p1
¼ p1  d1
p1  s1
; ð9Þ
p2  c2
p2
¼ p2  d2
p2  s2
: ð10ÞThe above conditions indicate that for channel coordination with two independent products is achieved if the ratio of the chan-
nel proﬁt per unit to the selling price is the same as the ratio of the retailer’s proﬁt per unit to the difference between the selling
price and the return credit, which requires that the return credit should not exceed the wholesale price. We see from the above
conditions that the coordinating parameters are independent of the demand distribution.
Case-2: Full returns with partial credit, one-way full substitution
Consider the case where the retailer is allowed to return all unsold products to the manufacturer with partial credit and
only product 1 is substituted with product 2 with probability one, if stock-out occurs. The condition under which coordina-
tion is achieved is given below. If one-way substitution is effective for the other product, the indices will simply be inter-
changed and F will be replaced by G.
Proposition 3.2. Let a ¼ 1; b ¼ 0;R1 ¼ R2 ¼ 1. Then, channel coordination is achieved ifFðQ1Þ ¼
c2ðp2  s2Þ þ p2ðs2  d2 þ d1  c1Þ þ s2ðp1 þ c1Þ
s1p2  s2p1
; ð11Þprovided that the r.h.s of (11) lies in (0,1).
Note that, unlike the previous case, the asymmetry in the substitution behavior resulted in a condition that depends on
the demand distribution. In particular, this condition requires that the service level for product 1 satisﬁes the condition given
in the r.h.s. of (11).
Case-3: One-way full substitution with no returns. Suppose again we have one-way full substitution but returns are not al-
lowed. Such an agreement fails to coordinate the channel.0
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The expected total proﬁt and the expected proﬁt of the retailer. For Product 1, the parameters c1; d1; p1; s1 are respectively, 2.0, 4.22, 7.0 and 3.05. For
t c2;d2; p2; s2 are 3.0, 5.0, 7.0 and 3.5.
Table 1
Case-2: Proﬁt share for one-way full substitution with partial credit, full returns.
s1 s2 EPR %EPR EPR %EPR EPR %EPR
d1 ¼ 4:5, d2 ¼ 3, d1 ¼ 6, d2 ¼ 4:5 d1 ¼ 7, d2 ¼ 5:5
1,5 0.18 129.30 73,08 64,802 36,63 21,80 12,32
2 0.77 133.53 75,47 69,03 39,01 26,03 14,71
2,5 1,36 137.76 77,86 73,2568 41,40 30,26 17,10
3 1,96 141.98 80,25 77,48 43,79 34,48 19,49
3,5 2,55 146.21 82,64 81,71 46,18 38,71 21,88
4 3,15 150.44 85,03 85,94 48,57 42,94 24,27
Ü. Gürler, A. Yılmaz / Applied Mathematical Modelling 34 (2010) 539–551 547Proposition 3.3. Let a ¼ 1; b ¼ 0, R1 ¼ 0 and R2 ¼ 0. Then, channel coordination requires c1 ¼ d1 and c2 ¼ d2. Hence, the system
is suboptimal, unless the manufacturer makes zero proﬁt.
Case-4: One-way full substitution with full returns and full credit
This is a special case of Case-2 with s1 ¼ d1; s2 ¼ d2. The manufacturer pays the wholesale price back for all the unsold
items. This unbalanced system in favor of the retailer is suboptimal.
Proposition 3.4. Suppose a ¼ 1; b ¼ 0;R1 ¼ 1, R2 ¼ 1, s1 ¼ d1 and s2 ¼ d2. Then the system is suboptimal.
Example 3. Recall that in Examples 1 and 2 we have observed that the coordinatin can not be achieved with the given
wholesale prices and return credits. Coordinating parameters are obtained as follows. With the same production costs
and selling prices, i.e. c1 ¼ 2:0; p1 ¼ 7; c2 ¼ 3:0; p2 ¼ 7, the values of the wholesale price and the return credits that coordi-
nate the channel are obtained as d1 ¼ 4:22; s1 ¼ 3:05 and d2 ¼ 5:0; s2 ¼ 3:50, respectively. These parameters yield the same
optimal retailer order quantities 49 and 30 with the optimal proﬁt of 90.8 for the retailer. Since the total expected channel
proﬁt is 170.1, we observe that the retailer gets most of the proﬁt. However, other coordinating parameters would result in
different shares of the proﬁt among the manufacturer and the retailer, as will be discussed in the next example. The resulting
proﬁt functions with these particular coordinating parameters are given in Fig. 4.
Next we consider an example that illustrates how the total proﬁt is splitted between the manufacturer and the retailer
under different values wholesale prices and return credits that coordinate the system.
Example 4. For this example we consider identical negative binomial demand distributions for the two products, the
parameters of which are set to ri ¼ 5; pi ¼ 0:25 for i=1,2. The resulting means and variances are EðYÞ ¼ EðXÞ ¼ r=p and
VðXÞ ¼ VðYÞ ¼ rð1 pÞ=p2. We consider Case 2 where coordination is achieved under full returns with partial credit. We set
the costs of producing one unit of Product 1 and 2 as c1 ¼ 3; c2 ¼ 2, respectively and the corresponding selling prices as
p1 ¼ 9 and p2 ¼ 7. The optimal production quantitities Q1;Q2 of the manufacturer that maximizes, EPTðQ1;Q2Þ are found and
then the transfer payments and buyback credits that achieve channel coordination are investigated using the results of
Proposition 3.2. The optimal production quantities for Case 2 are found as Q 1 ¼ 14 and Q2 ¼ 31 with the corresponding total
expected chain proﬁt, EPTðQ1;Q2Þ of 177.808. In this case recall that Product 2 is substituted for Product 1 with probability
one. Hence as expected, the optimal production quantity of the Product 2 is larger despite the fact that the unit proﬁt of
Product 1 is larger.
It is of interest to see the impact of the coordinating wholesale prices and return credits on the proﬁt share among the
parts of the channel. To illustrate this, the expected proﬁt of the retailer and the percentage of his share, denoted by
%EPR, are obtained for different choices of wholesale prices d1, d2 and return credits s1 and s2, and the results are displayed
in Table 1. As expected the retailer’s share increase with the return credit and decrease with the wholesale price, and whole-
sale prices have more impact on how the proﬁt is shared among the parts of the channel.4. Conclusion
In this study, a simple supply chain structure with a single retailer and a manufacturer is considered for two substitutable
products. The retailer is allowed to return some products to the manufacturer according to the contract between the retailer
and the manufacturer. We provide the expressions for the total expected channel proﬁt, manufacturers expected proﬁt and
the retailers expected proﬁt under general model parameters. Special cases regarding the substitution probabilities, return
credits and return percentages are investigated for channel coordination. In a similar study of [1] with a single product, it
was found that channel coordination was not achieved with full returns and full credits. This is consistent with our result.
We have found that channel coordination is not achieved for no returns cases. We have also provided expected proﬁt expres-
sions for the special case of exponential demand and elaborated on the model with several examples where the demand has
exponential or negative binomial distributions, respectively.
It would be interesting to extend the results of this study to correlated multi products and multi-period settings. Other
contract types with multiple products are also worthwhile to consider.
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The following results on integrals are needed in some of the derivations below:Z 1
Q2
Z Q1
0
½Q1  xdFðxÞdGðyÞ ¼
Z Q1
0
FðxÞdx GðQ2Þ
Z Q1
0
FðxÞdx
Z 1
Q1
Z Q1þQ2x
Q1x
½Q2  yþ Q1  xdGðyÞdFðxÞ ¼
Z 1
Q1
Z Q1þQ2x
Q1x
GðyÞdydFðxÞ: ð12ÞCalculation of EPTðQ1;Q2Þ
Referring to Fig. 1, proﬁt expressions in each region can be written asðaÞ pa ¼ p1xþ p2y x 6 Q1; y 6 Q2
ðbÞ pb ¼ p2yþ p2axþ Q1ðp1  p2aÞ xP Q1; y 6 Q2; aðx Q1Þ < Q2  y
ðcÞ pc ¼ p1Q1 þ p2Q2 xP Q1; y 6 Q2; aðx Q1Þ > Q2  y
ðdÞ pd ¼ p1Q1 þ p2Q2 xP Q1; yP Q2
ðeÞ pe ¼ p1Q1 þ p2Q2 x 6 Q1; yP Q2;Q1  x < bðy Q2Þ
ðf Þ pf ¼ p1xþ p1byþ Q2ðp2  p1bÞ x 6 Q1; yP Q2;Q1  x > bðy Q2ÞSimilar terms in different proﬁt expressions are collected and their contribution to the overall expected proﬁt are given as
follows:
Term p1x in region ða [ f Þ:p1
Z Q1
0
x
Z Q2þðQ1xÞb
0
dGðyÞdFðxÞ ¼ p1
Z Q1
0
xGðQ2 þ
ðQ1  xÞ
b
ÞdFðxÞ:Applying integration by parts we write the above term asp1 Q1GðQ2ÞFðQ1Þ 
Z Q1
0
G Q2 þ
ðQ1  xÞ
b
 
FðxÞdx þ ðQ1 þ bQ2Þ
Z Q2þQ1b
Q2
FðQ1 þ bðQ2  uÞÞdGðuÞ
"
b
Z Q2þQ1b
Q2
FðQ1 þ bðQ2  uÞÞudGðuÞ
#
: ð13ÞTerm p2y in region ða [ bÞp2 Q2GðQ2ÞFðQ1Þ 
Z Q2
0
F Q1 þ
ðQ2  xÞ
a
 
GðxÞdxþ ðQ2 þ aQ1Þ
Z Q1þQ2a
Q1
GðQ2 þ aðQ1  uÞÞdFðuÞ
"
a
Z Q1þQ2a
Q1
GðQ2 þ aðQ1  uÞÞudFðuÞ
#
: ð14ÞTerm p1by in region ðf Þp1b
Z Q2þQ1b
Q2
y
Z Q1þbðQ2yÞ
0
dFðxÞdGðyÞ ¼ p1b
Z Q2þQ1b
Q2
yFðQ1 þ bðQ2  yÞÞdGðyÞ: ð15ÞTerm p2ax in region ðbÞp2a
Z Q1þQ2a
Q1
xGðQ2 þ aðQ1  xÞÞdFðxÞ: ð16ÞTerm Q2ðp2  p1bÞ in region ðf ÞQ2ðp2  p1bÞ FðQ1ÞGðQ2Þ þ
Z Q1
0
G Q2 þ
ðQ1  xÞ
b
 
dFðxÞ
 
: ð17ÞTerm Q1ðp1  p2aÞ in region ðbÞQ1ðp1  p2aÞ FðQ1ÞGðQ2Þ þ
Z Q2
0
F Q1 þ
ðQ2  yÞ
a
 
dGðyÞ
 
: ð18Þ
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ðdÞ ðp1Q1 þ p2Q2ÞFðQ1ÞGðQ2Þ; ð19Þ
ðeÞ ðp1Q1 þ p2Q2Þ
Z 1
Q1
Z 1
Q2þ
ðQ1xÞ
b
dGðyÞdFðxÞ ¼ ðp1Q1 þ p2Q2Þ
Z Q1
0
G Q2 þ
ðQ1  xÞ
b
 
dFðxÞ
¼ ðp1Q1 þ p2Q2ÞðFðQ1Þ 
Z Q1
0
G Q2 þ
ðQ1  xÞ
b
 
dFðxÞÞ; ð20Þ
ðf Þ ðp1Q1 þ p2Q2Þ GðQ2Þ 
Z Q2
0
F Q1 þ
ðQ2  yÞ
a
 
dGðyÞ
 
: ð21ÞThe sum of (19)–(21) results in the following for the contribution of p1Q1 þ p2Q2ðp1Q1 þ p2Q2Þ 1þ GðQ2ÞFðQ1Þ 
Z Q2
0
F Q1 þ
ðQ2  yÞ
a
 
dGðyÞ 
Z Q1
0
G Q2 þ
ðQ1  xÞ
b
 
dFðxÞ

: ð22ÞFinally EPTðQ1;Q2Þ is obtained by the sum of (13)–(18), (22) and c1Q1  c2Q2.
Calculation of the EPRðQ1;Q2Þ
The derivation of the expression for the retailer’s proﬁt is done similarly by considering different regions as given in Fig. 2.
The proﬁt expressions in tese regions are written asðaÞ pa ¼ p1xþ p2yþ R1Q1s1 þ R2Q2s2
ðbÞ pb ¼ p1xþ p2yþ R1Q1s1 þ ðQ2  yÞs2
ðcÞ pc ¼ p1xþ p1ðbðy Q2ÞÞ þ R1Q1s1 þ p2Q2
ðdÞ pd ¼ p2Q2 þ p1ðxþ bðy Q2ÞÞ þ ðQ1  x bðy Q2ÞÞs1
ðeÞ pe ¼ p1xþ p2yþ R2Q2s2 þ ðQ1  xÞs1
ðf Þ pf ¼ p1xþ p2yþ ðQ1  xÞs1 þ ðQ2  yÞs2
ðgÞ pg ¼ p2yþ p2ðaðx Q1ÞÞ þ R2Q2s2 þ p1Q1
ðhÞ ph ¼ p1Q1 þ p2ðyþ aðx Q1ÞÞ þ ðQ2  y aðx Q1ÞÞs2
ðiÞ pi ¼ p1Q1 þ p2Q2
ðjÞ pj ¼ p1Q1 þ p2Q2
ðkÞ pk ¼ p1Q1 þ p2Q2As before, similar terms in the above expressions are collected to calculate the contribution to the expected proﬁt as follows:
Term p1x in region a [ b [ e [ fp1
Z Q1
0
x
Z Q2
0
dGðyÞdFðxÞ ¼ p1GðQ2Þ Q1FðQ1Þ 
Z Q1
0
FðxÞdx
 
ð23ÞTerm p2y in region ða [ b [ e [ f Þp2FðQ1Þ Q2GðQ2Þ 
Z Q2
0
GðyÞdy
 
ð24ÞTerm R1Q1s1 in region ða [ bÞZ Q2
0
x
Z R1 :Q1
0
R1Q1s1dFðxÞdGðyÞ ¼ R1Q1s1FðR1Q1ÞGðQ2Þ ð25ÞTerm R2Q2s2 in region ða [ eÞ
R2Q2s2GðR2Q2ÞFðQ1Þ ð26ÞTerm ðQ2  yÞs2 in region ðb [ f ÞR2Q2s2FðQ1ÞGðR2Q2Þ þ s2FðQ1Þ
Z Q2
R2Q2
GðyÞdy ð27ÞTerm ðQ1  xÞs1 in region ðb [ f ÞR1Q1s1GðQ2ÞFðR1Q1Þ þ s1GðQ2Þ
Z Q1
R1Q1
FðxÞdx ð28ÞTerm p1Q1 þ p2Q2 in region ðiÞZ 1
Q1
Z 1
Q2
ðp1Q1 þ p2Q2ÞdGðyÞdFðxÞ ¼ ðp1Q1 þ p2Q2ÞGðQ2ÞFðQ1Þ ð29Þ
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Q2
Z Q1
0
p2Q2dFðxÞdGðyÞ ¼ p2Q2GðQ2ÞFðQ1Þ ð30ÞTerm p1Q1 in ðjÞp1Q1GðQ2ÞFðQ1Þ  p1Q1
Z 1
Q2
FðQ1  ðbðy Q2ÞÞÞdGðyÞ ð31ÞTerm p1ðxþ bðy Q2ÞÞ in region ðc [ dÞZ Q2þQ1b
Q2
Z Q1ðbðyQ2ÞÞ
0
p1ðxþ bðy Q2ÞÞdFðxÞdGðyÞ ¼ p1GðQ2Þ
Z Q1
0
FðxÞdx
 p1
Z Q1
0
FðxÞG Q2 þ
ðQ1  xÞ
b
 
dxþ p1Q1
Z Q2þQ1b
Q2
FðQ1  ðbðy Q2ÞÞÞdGðyÞ ð32ÞTerm R1Q1s1 in region ðcÞ
Z Q2þR1Q1b
Q2
Z R1Q1bðyQ2Þ
0
R1Q1s1dFðxÞdGðyÞ ¼ R1Q1s1
Z Q2þR1Q1b
Q2
FðR1Q1  bðy Q2ÞÞdGðyÞ ð33ÞFinally term ½Q1  x bðy Q2Þs1 in region ðdÞ contributesZ 1
Q2
Z Q1bðyQ2Þ
R1 :Q1bðyQ2Þ
½Q1  x bðy Q2Þs1dFðxÞdGðyÞ ð34ÞThe expression for EPRðQ1;Q2Þ is then obtained after some algebra, by summing the terms in (23)–(34).
Proof of Proposition 3.2. For this special case EPTðQ1;Q2Þ reduces toEPTðQ1;Q2Þ ¼ p1
Z Q1
0
FðxÞdxþ ðp2  c2ÞQ2  p2
Z Q2
0
GðyÞFðQ1 þ Q2  yÞdyþ ðp1  c1ÞQ1Using Leibniz‘s rule and setting the ﬁrst partial derivatives to zero we have;0 ¼ p1  c1  p1FðQ1Þ  p2
Z Q2
0
GðyÞf ðQ1 þ Q2  yÞdy ð35Þ
0 ¼ p2  c2  p2GðQ2ÞFðQ1Þ  p2
Z Q2
0
GðyÞf ðQ1 þ Q2  yÞdy ð36ÞFrom which we obtain;1 FðQ1ÞGðQ2Þ ¼
c2 þ p1  c1  FðQ1Þp1
p2
: ð37ÞThe partial derivatives of (3) set to zero result in:0 ¼ ðs1  p1ÞFðQ1Þ þ ðp1  d1Þ þ ðs2  p2Þ
Z Q2
0
f ðQ1 þ Q2  yÞGðyÞdðyÞ ð38Þ
0 ¼ ðs2  p2ÞFðQ1ÞGðQ2Þ þ ðp2  d2Þ þ ðs2  p2Þ
Z Q2
0
f ðQ1 þ Q2  yÞGðyÞdðyÞ ð39ÞSolving (38) and (39), we getðs1  p1ÞFðQ1Þ þ ðp1  d1Þ  ðp2  d2Þ½ =ðs2  p2Þ ¼ FðQ1ÞGðQ2Þ ð40ÞCombining (40) and (41) we get the result.
Proof of Proposition 3.3. In this case, EPTðQ1;Q2Þ, is given by:EPTðQ1;Q2Þ ¼ p1
Z Q1
0
FðxÞdxþ ðp2  c2ÞQ2  p2
Z Q2
0
GðyÞFðQ1 þ Q2  yÞdyþ ðp1  c1ÞQ1
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Z Q2
0
GðyÞf ðQ1 þ Q2  yÞdy ð41Þ
0 ¼ p2  c2  p2GðQ2ÞFðQ1Þ  p2
Z Q2
0
GðyÞf ðQ1 þ Q2  yÞdy ð42ÞFrom (4) we get the ﬁrst order conditions as0 ¼ p1  d1  p1FðQ1Þ  p2
Z Q2
0
f ðQ1 þ Q2  yÞGðyÞdy ð43Þ
0 ¼ p2  d2  p2FðQ1ÞGðQ2Þ  p2
Z Q2
0
f ðQ1 þ Q2  yÞGðyÞdy ð44ÞEqs. (41), (43), (42) and (44) imply that c1 ¼ d1; c2 ¼ d2 which is not feasible.
Proof of Proposition 3.4. This is a special case of case 2. Consider the expression given by (39) for the ﬁrst order conditions
of the retailer’s proﬁt. Letting s2 ¼ d2, we get0 ¼ ðp2  s2Þ 1 FðQ1ÞGðQ2ÞÞ 
Z Q2
0
f ðQ1 þ Q2  yÞGðyÞdy
 
ð45ÞNoting thatZ Q2
0
f ðQ1 þ Q2  yÞGðyÞdy ¼
Z Q1þQ2
Q1
GðQ1 þ Q2  uÞdFðuÞ(45) is written as1 FðQ1ÞGðQ2Þ ¼
Z Q1þQ2
Q1
GðQ1 þ Q2  uÞdFðuÞ 6
Z 1
Q1
dFðuÞ ¼ 1 FðQ1Þwhich is impossible unless Q1 ¼ Q2 ¼ 1. Hence, the system is suboptimal.References
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